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Abstract 
The closed-closed-loop supply chain is a complex system with many uncertain factors, but it is certain that the gains 
of the participants in the system after the formation of a coalition are greater than the gains without cooperation. In 
the process of applying the cooperative game model to get an income allocation scheme which maintains a stable 
coalition, the researchers of this paper found that classical solutions to cooperative games - Shapley values suffer 
unreasonable high uncertainty. Therefore, this paper modifies the Shapley value method, and then uses the modified 
method to solve the allocation problem of the closed-loop supply chain under the third-party reclaim mode. The 
results show that the modified Shapley value has lower uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is such a supply chain that, in addition to the traditional supply chain 
activities, it also includes the reclaim, recycle and reuse of the used products. There are various types of 
closed-loop supply chains. Among them, the third-party reclaim mode is that the manufacturers or the 
distributors pay the third-party reverse logistics service providers  to return the products [1]. Under the 
Third-party reclaim mode loop supply chain system, the participants include the manufacturers, the 
distributors and the recyclers, who are independent decision makers. Manufacturers provide the 
distributors with products for selling to the customers , and the recyclers reclaim the waste products from 
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the consumers. The waste products are available for manufacturers to remanufacture [2]. Under this mode 
of closed-loop supply chain, the cooperation relat ionship among the participants is obvious. It is proved 
that the cooperation can reduce overall costs and increase revenue, so that cooperat ion is their common 
optimal choice. Reasonable gains allocation among the participants is the basis to maintain this 
cooperation. Therefore, it is a problem to be solved under Multiplayer cooperative game  [3]. 
Multiplayer cooperative game is also known as the coalitional game. To maintain a stable coalit ion, a 
major premise is that each party of the coalition gets greater gains than they can get under non -
cooperation. The purpose of solving the cooperative game is to seek such a stable gains allocation stra tegy 
that maintains a coalition. Relat ive to the non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory is not 
mature, and the three most fundamental p roblems are not well solved  yet, namely, the solution of 
cooperative game, cooperative game solution structural stability and the formation of cooperative game 
solution mechanism. So  far, Shapley value is considered a superiority solution to dynamic coalition [4]. 
Shapley value, named in honor of Lloyd Shapley, who introduced it in 1953, describes one approach to 
the fair allocation of gains obtained by cooperation among several actors  [5]. In this paper, we modified 
the Shapley value method for its high uncertainty, and use a modified Shapley value method to solve the 
gains allocation problem under the third-party reclaim mode of the closed-loop supply chain. 
2. Uncertainty of Shapley value in coalition game and its improvement 
The definition of Shapley value implies that the participants outside coalition S form another coalition 
N S
 against S. Under this assumption, the coalition S's gain is certain. As Shapley participants are 
assumed to join a particu lar coalit ion randomly and are subject to uniform distribution, which is 
inconsistent with the reality. That is why the distribution of gains applying Shapley value needs further 
consideration [6].  
In reality, with the formation of coalition S, the remaining N S  participants may have different 
coalition states, causing different gains, and the result of the d ifferent coalition states of the N S  will 
affect the gains of coalition S. That means the gains of the coalition S is not fixed, but is change with the 
coalition states of the remaining participants. The assumption of the Shapley value solution is only an 
ideal state. This paper argues that such an unreasonable assumption is the reason why Shapley Value is 
with higher uncertainty. 
According to definit ion of Shapley  value described with the language of probability theory, Shapley 
value is the mathematical expectation of each participant’s contribution to the coalition S. Maintaining the 
basic premise of the concept, according to the above reasons, the uncertainty of the gain of coalition S  
causes the uncertainty of participant i’s contribution to the coalit ion S, resulting in uncertain  contributions 
of participants to coalition S. Therefore, need to reconsider the definit ion of participant i’s contribution to 
the coalition S. 
Define N SiU  as the coalition state set of participants belonging to N S , where i S , and N Sju  is an 
element of N SiU  . Further, define ( )N SjV S u   as the gain of coalition S under the state of N Sju   and ( )N Sjp S u   
as the probability of coalition S coming into form under the state of N Sju  . Then we have 
( ) 1
N S N S
j i
N S
j
u U
p S u
 


 ¦
, and ( )N Sjp S u   is positive correlated with the gains of the participants belong to N S . 
Considering the participants are rational, we can define 
( ) ( ) ( )
N S N S
j i
N S N S N S
j j j
u U
p S u V u V u
 
  

 y ¦                    (1) 
Define ^ `( ) ( ) ( )N S N S N S N Si j j jS u V S u V S i u   '    as the contribution of i to the coalition S under the state of 
N S
ju

. According to total probability formula, get participant i’s contribution to the coalition. 
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The new Shapley value is the participant’s contribution to the coalition, as  
' '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1,2,...,i N Si i
i S i S
P S S P S E S U i nM 
 
 '   ¦ ¦             (3) 
It is obvious that the modified  Shapley value satisfies Shapley’s three prerequisites which proves a fair 
and reasonable allocation, and also meets Shapley’s three axioms. That means the gains allocation based 
on the modified shapely value is also a reasonable solution to a cooperative game and it is expected that 
the modified one has an advantage of lower uncertainty. To demonstrate that, need to introduce an 
important property of conditional mathematical expectation:  
Assume ] and K are mutually dependent random variables, for any x , when x]  , ( )E xK ]  is the 
estimation of K  with the minimum variance. 
If the ( )E xK ]   is denoted by the characteristic function of the random variable ] . When x]  , its 
value is ( )E xK ]  . In  the defin ition, ( )E xK ]  is a random variable, and its mathematic expectation is 
( ( ))E E E xK K ]  . And this relationship also applies in the discrete occasions. 
Accordingly, (2) shows that the modified Shapley value is the value of contribution of participant  i to 
the coalition S with minimum variance, because 
' ' 2 ' 2 2( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )N si i i i i iS E S U SM M M'     '             (4) 
According to the mathematical description of the uncertainty of Shapley value and˄4˅, get 
'2 ' ' 2 2 2( )( ( ) ) ( )( ( ) )i i i i
i S i S
R P S S R P S SM M
 
 '  d  ' ¦ ¦   (5) 
Formula˄5˅ shows that the modified Shapley value has lower uncertainty than the Shapley value. 
3. Gains Allocation Strategy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Modified Shapley Value 
Gains allocation is a critical issue in the closed-loop supply chain after the format ion of cooperation 
coalition. The fo llowing is based on the above modified Shapley value to establish a gains allocation 
model of closed loop supply chain, and then gives a numeric example. 
From the current point of v iew of research on closed-loop supply chain, the closed-loop supply chain is 
a complex system. However, the cooperation among the manufacturers, distributors and third-party 
recyclers has consistency of interests, thus creating a cooperative game is a rat ional choice. The modified 
Shapley value can be applied to establish gains allocation model. In o rder to facilitate further research and 
to simplify model parameters, the assumptions to the model are as follows:  
(1) In the market, there is one manufacturer, one distributor, and one recycler , and  they are all rational 
actors.  
(2) Suppose the demand of the product market is: q tp T , where ,t T are constants and 0t ! ˈT >1.  
(3) Assume the reclaim rate of the product is 1.  
(4) If the manufacturer doesn’t cooperate with the recycler, the manufacturer's unit cost of product is 
0c ; If they co-operate, the manufacturer’s manufacturing cost is related to the condition of the reclaimed 
products by the recycler. The unit cost of reclaiming by recycler is 2c . The reclaiming cost should be 
related to the condition of products, and also be related to the cost of manufacturing the product, when the 
product is new and when the product's manufacturing cost is high, the reclaiming price tends to 
correspondingly increase. The unit cost for distributor distributing products is 1c .  
(5) Let H denote the condition and also utilization rate  of the reclaimed  products, where 0 1H  . The 
more H close to 1 the newer the reclaimed products; the more H close to 0, the older the products. Due to 
the cost of reclaiming products are positively related to the condition of the reclaimed products and also 
positively related to the manufacturing costs, may assume the reclaiming cost 22 0c cH . If without 
cooperation, the recycler sells the reclaimed products to the manufacturer with unit price 0cH . If the three 
participants form a coalition, the coalition’s manufacturing cost is ' 20 0 0(1 )c c cH H   . 
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In the closed-loop supply chain, the manufacturer is at the core position, and the d istributor and the 
recycler are only related with the sales price o f new products and the reclaiming price of used products, so 
their gains mainly  depend on the manufacturer's decision. In  the cooperation game, the manufacturer is 
the large participation and is also where the coalition risk is located. 
To allocate the gains, it  first needs to solve the characteristic function of each sate. Let N be the set of 
the participants of the closed-loop supply chain. N= {manufacturer, distributor, recycler} = {1, 2, 3}. 
Assume ( ) 0V   . The following considers the non-empty set of coalition. 
It is quite outright to prove that the format ion of coalition can  improve their gains. It is omitted due to 
limited space. Then an optimal gains allocation strategy is needed to ensure the stability of the coalition. 
The above modified  Shapley value is applied to calculate the allocation strategy. The steps are as follows: 
first of all, based on the modified Shapley value, calcu late the conditional probability, conditional gains, 
and their characteristic functions of various states. Next, calculate the contribution of the participants to 
the coalition. Finally, calcu late each participant’s gain allocation according to its contribution to the 
coalition. Let the gains allocation of the manufacturer, the distributor and the recycler are 1 2 3,   and M M M , 
respectively. The results are 
1
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From the expressions of 1 2 3,   and M M M , it can be seen that, the manufacturer’s gain is heavily 
influenced by the condition of the reclaimed products for recycling. This result is reasonable because the 
condition of the reclaimed  products influence manufacturing cost of new products, and the later will 
further affect the distributor's sales price and quantity, and the condition of reclaimed products for 
recycling affect the cost and quantity of reclaiming. In general, the condition of the reclaimed products for 
recycling has an impact on the closed-loop supply chain system as a whole. 
Next, th is paper gives a numerical example to demonstrate the difference of the result between the 
modified Shapley value and the classical one.  
4. Numerical Example 
To verify the modified Shapley value has lower uncertainty in gains allocation of closed-loop supply 
chain under third-party reclaim mode, a numerical example is given below. Suppose the demand of the 
product market is: 2400*q p . The unit cost for distributor distributing products is 1.  Assume if the 
manufacturer doesn’t cooperate with the recycler, the manufacturer's unit cost of product is 4 and the 
reclaiming cost is 24H , and then if they co-operate by forming a coalition, the manufacturer’s 
manufacturing cost is 24 4 4H H  . 
Put the above numerical assumptions and 0.5H  into the formula of classical Shapley value and get 
the gains allocation and variances of the manufacture, the distributor, and the recycler, respectively 
984  Zheng Yingfei et al. / Energy Procedia 5 (2011) 980–984
1 2 39.1, 12.6, 3.3M M M   ; 2 2 21 2 320.6,  18.2,  20.1R R R    
Put the above numerical assumptions into the formula of modified Shapley value and get the gains 
allocation and variances of the manufacture, the distributor, and the recycler, respectively  
' ' '
1 2 39.1, 13.2, 2.7M M M   ; 2 2 201 02 0320.6, 17.6, 18.5R R R    
First, from the allocation results, it can be seen that there is no change in manufacturer's gains, which is 
due to the coalition condition which has no influence on the manufacturer’s earning; and the modified 
Shapley value only cause the gains re-allocation between the distributor and recycler.  
Second, from the uncertainty of the results, it can be seen that the result of the modified  Shapley value 
has lower uncertainty (variance). Specifically, the uncertainty of manufacturers does not change, and the 
distributor and the recycler have got uncertainty dropped.  
For d ifferent values of H , through the above process the research gets the similar results and the same 
conclusions. It shows that although the condition of the reclaimed products has influence on all of the 
participants. But it does not change that the allocation results through the modified Shapley have lower 
uncertainty compared with the results through classical Shapley value. 
5. Conclusion 
As classical Shapley participants are assumed to jo in a particular coalit ion randomly and are subject to 
uniform distribution, which is inconsistent with the reality of the coalition forming process in the closed-
loop supply chain under the third-party reclaim mode, so that a modified Shapley value is developed for 
gains allocation among the manufacture, the distributor and the recycler.  
This research gets a general modified Shapley value allocation result of the closed-loop supply chain 
under third-party reclaim mode and then gives a numerical example. The numerical  example shows that 
the results applying modified Shapley value suffer lower uncertainty. 
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